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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
RIO VISTA LIMITED, a Utah 
Corporation dba MOAB U-SERVE 
aka STARS FOOD STORE; LA SAL OIL 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, dba 
GORDON'S SINCLAIR; STATE OF UTAH; 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE; 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee State of Utah does not object to the statement of 
jurisdiction described by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellee State of Utah concurs with Appellant that the 
abuse of discretion standard applies to the granting of the Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. However, in regard to 
Appellant's sixth issue regarding the trial court's interpretation 
of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the 
appropriate .standard of review is one of "correction of error". 
Oner Int'l (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 
1993), citing State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). 
Case No. 930612-CA 
Priority 15 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 12(e)# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Addendum "1") 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Addendum "2") 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Addendum "3") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 22, 1988, Appellant filed a Complaint against the 
State of Utah and others for damages related to its property in 
Moab, Utah. (R. 1-13). 
2. On August 25, 1988, Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion 
for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12 (e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, (R. 41-43). 
3. On September 26, 1988, Judge Bunnell, District Court 
Judge, issued a "Ruling on Defendant, State of Utah's, Motion for 
More Definite Statement." (R. 52-53). Said Ruling states that 
"The Court grants the Motion and orders that the plaintiff file an 
amendment to the pleadings . . . . " URCP Rule 12 (e) requires 
that the amended complaint be filed within ten days or the court 
may strike the pleading or "make such order as it deems just." 
4. Said Ruling was mailed to counsel for the various parties 
on September 26, 1988. (R. 53). 
5. No Amended Complaint was filed. Apparently, by 
Appellant's own admission, an amended complaint was actually even 
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prepared by Appellant's counsel, Dale F. Gardiner, on or about 
December 1, 1988, but such was never filed, and Appellee State of 
Utah was not aware that such was drafted until it was presented as 
an exhibit in the subject Motion to Dismiss proceeding in 1993. 
(R. 242-253). 
6. In December, 1988, Appellant apparently filed for 
bankruptcy. Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy. (R. 69) . The Notice clearly 
states that Dale F. Gardiner is withdrawing as counsel and that 
,f[c]ounsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H. Speciale, 
Esq... .» (R. 69). 
7. No Amended Complaint was filed from the date of the 
Court's Ruling (September 26, 1988) to present. 
8. Apparently Appellant entered into a contingency fee 
agreement with Steven C. Tycksen in early 1993 (presumably then, 
before the Motion to Dismiss was filed). (See Appellant's Brief at 
24 and R. 284-286) . 
9. After four and one-half years, with no amended complaint 
filed, Appellee State of Utah, on March 26, 1993, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice or Strike and Points 
and Authorities. (R. 71-75). Said Motion indicated that URCP 
12(e) required the conforming pleading to be filed within ten (10) 
days or the court may make such order as it deems just. 
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Additionally, URCP 41 (b) was cited as allowing for a dismissal for 
lack of compliance with a court order. 
10. On April 7, 1993, Appellant, through attorney Steven C. 
Tycksen, filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss as well as a 
seven-page memorandum opposing dismissal. (R. 110-120) . An 
affidavit was also attached to the objection. (R. 121-125). 
11. On April 19, 1993, Appellee State of Utah filed a Reply 
in support of the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 136-139). 
12. On June 7, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision stating that the Motion to Dismiss "is now at issue and 
ready for decision of the Court." (R. 149-150). 
13. On June 7, 1993, Appellant attempted to submit another 
memorandum against the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 151-162) . 
14. On July 15, 1993, Judge Anderson entered an Order of 
Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice. (R. 167-169) . 
15. On July 15, 1993, Appellant filed a nineteen-page 
memorandum objecting to the order. (R. 175-196). 
16. On July 19, 1993, District Court Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
issued a "Ruling on Objections to Proposed Order" indicating that 
the objection was filed too late (most of it was faxed after 5:00 
p.m.). Despite procedural problems of considering the objections, 
Judge Anderson also indicated that, in any event, the "supplemental 
memoranda submitted by plaintiff before it filed the Notice to 
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Submit for Decision would not have altered the Court's decision." 
(R. 313-315)• 
17. Appellant appealed the Judge's Order of Dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Anderson properly found that the Appellant was not 
prejudiced by any technical noncompliance with Rule 4-506(3) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Plaintiff had counsel before and during the Motion to Dismiss 
proceeding. The notice of withdrawal and indication of the 
appointment of George H. Speciale as counsel for Hartford Leasing 
Corporation (the Plaintiff) gave Defendants every indication that 
Mr. Speciale was its counsel. Judge Anderson did not abuse his 
discretion. To the contrary, it would have been an abuse of 
discretion to allow a four and one-half year extension of time to 
file an amended complaint after a motion for more definite 
statement was granted. 
URCP Rule 12 (e) allows the Court to take such action as it 
"deems necessary". This certainly can include a dismissal with 
prejudice. URCP Rule 41 (b) also allows a dismissal with prejudice 
for failure to comply with the Court. Given the extremely long 
period of failure to comply with the Court, such a dismissal with 
prejudice was certainly not an abuse of discretion. 
There was no abuse of discretion for not holding a hearing. 
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Appellant waived this hearing in its Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Appellant did not provide any argument in its Brief that Appellant 
would have offered something at the hearing that the Judge had not 
considered. If there was any error here, it was harmless. It 
would have been an abuse of discretion not to grant Appellee's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
There was no abuse of discretion in the Judge's adherence to 
the Court Rules regarding memoranda. A page limit, for instance 
would make no sense, if one can file as many memoranda as one 
wishes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION, 
DESPITE ANY LACK OF SPECIAL NOTICE UNDER UTAH 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-506(3) . 
Dale Gardiner filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel in 
1988 after the Court required an amended complaint to be filed due 
to the granting of a motion for more definite statement • The 
notice of withdrawal indicated that George H. Speciale was the new 
counsel. Appellant contends that this indication of new counsel is 
in the same paragraph as the bankruptcy notification and that 
therefore one should interpret the notice as George H. Speciale 
only being the counsel for bankruptcy. This interpretation is 
unreasonable. If Appellant was to be unrepresented in this matter, 
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its withdrawing counsel should have been clearer. Also, one can 
interpret the notice as having an initial paragraph indicating that 
Dale Gardiner was withdrawing and a second paragraph indicating the 
remaining matters. 
Appellant is arguing that failure to comply with a 
notification requirement under Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-506 (3), forever precludes any further proceedings by the 
trial court. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3) 
states that when an attorney withdraws from a case, the opposing 
counsel must notify the unrepresented client in writing to obtain 
other counsel or appear in person before further proceedings are 
initiated by the opposing counsel. The Rule further states that 
"no further proceedings shall be held in the matter until 20 days 
have elapsed from the date of filing." It is a logical conclusion 
from reading the Rule, that the intent is to avoid a situation 
where an unrepresented person is facing proceedings without counsel 
and to avoid a situation where any new counsel does not have at 
least twenty days to prepare. 
Appellant was represented by counsel before and during the 
Motion to Dismiss proceeding and was not prejudiced by any 
potential "technical" violation of the "counsel notification 
requirement". The record shows that the new counsel, Steven 
Tycksen, was able to file extensive documents opposing the Motion 
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to Dismiss. 
Appellant's reliance on Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 
1984), is misplaced. In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court stated a 
relationship between obedience with court rules and the abuse of 
discretion standard. Sperry. however, does not mean that non-
prejudicial technical rule violations prohibit a Court from 
proceeding in a matter. The appropriate course for dealing with 
any technical violation of the "counsel notification" rule is to 
assure that the purpose of the rule is satisfied prior to any 
action that may prejudice an unrepresented party's rights. 
Even if there was a violation of the "counsel notification 
requirement," it would have been an abuse of the Court's discretion 
to not grant the Motion to Dismiss, where over four and one-half 
years passed without the filing of an amended complaint, which was 
required in order to prosecute the action. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE APPELLANT 
HAD NOT FILED A REQUIRED AMENDED COMPLAINT IN OVER 
FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEARS. 
"The burden is on the party attacking a dismissal for failure 
to prosecute [to] offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of 
diligence.'w Country Meadows v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d 
1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah 
State Univ. . 813 P.2d 1216# 1218 (Utah App. 1991). The decision 
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of the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss should not be 
interfered with unless the abuse of discretion is "clear." Country 
Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1214, citing Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. 
Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Here, there is no reasonable excuse for the Appellant to not 
have filed an amended complaint for over four and one-half years 
beyond the ten day time limit. In fact, no amended complaint 
against the State was ever served. Appellant admits that an 
amended complaint was prepared in 1988, but never filed. (R. 242-
253) . 
Appellant contends that the relevant factors enumerated in 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989) were not 
met. These factors include the conduct of the parties, opportunity 
each party had to move the case forward, what each party did to 
move it forward, prejudice, and injustice. However, the trial 
court properly considered these factors and concluded that 
dismissal was appropriate. 
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES AND WHAT EACH PARTY DID 
In Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216, the Utah Court of 
Appeals indicated that even though the defendant may not have moved 
the case forward, the plaintiff had a duty to exercise due 
diligence to prosecute its action. In this case, it would be 
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absurd for the State to prepare and file an amended complaint 
against itself in order to move the case forward or even to request 
that plaintiff prosecute the case against the public. 
Certainly, as stated above, the Appellant should have been 
able to serve and file an amended complaint within the four and a 
half years prior to the Motion to Dismiss. 
PREJUDICE AND INJUSTICE 
The State would be greatly prejudiced if the case were to move 
forward. In its original complaint, Hartford Leasing sought 
damages for the defendant's alleged breach of a lease agreement. 
The State vacated the subject building after employees became ill. 
This could have been caused by one or many factors, including mold, 
the gas plume, the carpet, etc. The building has been sold and 
alterations have occurred. It would be very difficult at this time 
to establish the causes of the illness that occurred almost six 
years ago. 
Appellee is even prejudiced in trying to argue this factor. 
Because no amended complaint was filed, no answer by the State has 
been filed. Therefore, it is not documented in the record of this 
case as to what the issues of the case will be. It is anticipated 
that if the State had to file an answer to an extremely late 
amended complaint, that the issues would not be limited to the gas 
plume, but would likely include construction defects that may now 
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have been altered in the building by the new owners. 
When a District Court grants a Motion for More Definite 
Statement and the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, and 
over four and one-half years passes since the ten day deadline, 
justice is served by dismissing the matter. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING THE DISMISSAL AS APPELLANT HAD 
NOT REACTIVATED THE CASE PRIOR TO ITS MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
Appellant argues that it obtained new counsel and reactivated 
the case, and therefore the case should not have been dismissed for 
lack of prosecution. However, there is nothing in the record of 
this case showing any action of new counsel prior to the motion to 
dismiss for lack of prosecution. The new counsel (or perhaps any 
of the attorneys that Appellant sought advice from over the past 
five years, including Dale Gardiner) could have file an amended 
complaint, but did not. 
Appellant misinterprets the case of Count ry Me adows v. 
Department of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993)• Appellant 
misconstrues this case when it argues that when a case is 
reactivated at any time, a motion to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution would be improper. In Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 
1216, the court made it clear that where the case is not 
reactivated prior to the dismissal motion, an attempt to reactivate 
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the case after the dismissal motion does not make the dismissal an 
abuse of discretion. 
Even though Appellant had a contingency fee agreement with the 
new counsel in this matter, prior to the filing of Appellee's 
Motion to Dismiss on March 26, 1993 (R.285-287), the new counsel 
did not file anything in the matter until April 7, 1993 (R. 110-
113) . Thus, Appellant had the opportunity to reactivate the case 
prior to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, but did not do so. 
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court under these 
circumstances. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE. 
The court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 
dismissal with prejudice. The Appellant had not filed an amended 
complaint in over four and one-half years. URCP 12(e) allows the 
court to "make such order as it deems just" when the Appellant is 
more than ten (10) days late. Certainly the great length of time 
here indicates that the Court's order of dismissal with prejudice 
was within the realm of reason under URCP 12(e) and not an abuse of 
discretion. 
This dismissal with prejudice is consistent with URCP Rule 
4Kb) and the decision of the Utah courts supporting dismissals 
-12-
with prejudice. County Meadows v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d 
1212, 1217 (Utah App. 1993); Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 
(Utah App. 1989); and Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1977). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY NOT HOLDING A HEARING WHEN THE APPELLANT 
INDICATED THE MATTER WAS AT ISSUE AND READY 
FOR DECISION AND APPELLANT OFFERS NO ARGUMENT 
AS TO HOW A HEARING MAY HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE. 
Appellant requested an oral argument at the time it responded 
to the Motion to Dismiss on April 7, 1993. (R. 112) . However, on 
June 7, 1993 (two months later), Appellant served a "Notice to 
Submit for Decision" which stated that the Motion for Dismissal "is 
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court." (R. 149-150) . 
The District Court interpreted the actions of Appellant as a 
waiver of the hearing request. (R. 313-314). 
Appellant argues that a hearing may not be waived under Rule 
4-501(3) (d) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Appellant's argument is flawed. Rule 4-501(3)(d) applies when a 
request for hearing is "denied." The trial court did not deny the 
request. The trial court ruled that Appellant waived the hearing. 
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant 
the motion to dismiss based upon a consideration of the court file 
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and the memoranda of the parties, when the Appellant withdrew a 
request for oral argument. 
Even if the Appellant's special language in its Notice to 
Submit for Decision was not a waiver of the hearing, Appellant has 
failed to indicate any argument in its Brief as to how such lack of 
hearing prejudiced the Appellant. See Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Additionally, since Appellant was over four and one-
half years late in complying with the Court decision in regard to 
amending the Complaint, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
for the Court to not grant the Motion to Dismiss, regardless of 
whether there was a hearing. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DISALLOWING 
THE APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Appellant sought to file a Supplemental Memorandum opposing 
the Motion to Dismiss after the Defendant had already submitted the 
Reply regarding the Motion to Dismiss. 
Rule 4-501 (1) (a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that the Memorandum in opposition to the Motion shall be 
no longer than ten pages in length unless waived by order of the 
Court. The Rule also provides for one memorandum in opposition. 
The Court appropriately interpreted Rule 4-501 and did not 
commit any error in granting the Motion to Dismiss based upon only 
having "one round" of memoranda. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee State of Utah respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the order of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court which granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 
DATED this 19th day of January, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
By 
AL£tf S. BACHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 12 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
35 XTTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties 6hall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1M7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(]) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
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ner, there was no abuse in the district court's to cross-examination, the purely specula^  
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witnesses, purportedly important to his case,
 m ^ 9 ™ ™ °
r l e y
 * ^^^
 5 ? 9 ?M
 » 
were actually present at trial and thus subject *u t a n iy'°>-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 AXJL3d 1272. 
§ 1 et &eq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
84. upon applicant's payment of costs or expenm 
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Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an abjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
pf the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
•that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
aent rewrote this rule to such an extent that a lamentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
detailed description is impracticable. lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of in Subdivision (3Kb). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
When rale applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a 
•eparate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 
prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
8TATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD XEASIN6 CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, a Utah 
Corporation, dba MOAB U-SERV, aka : 
STARS FOOD STORE, LaSALLE OIL CO., i 
a Utah corporation, dba GORDON'S 
SINCLAIR, STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL 8ERVICE and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
: Civil No. S80705692 
: Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant State of Utah ("Utah") has filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Hartford Leasing Corporation 
("Hartford") with prejudice for failure to prosecute, pursuant to 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. The other defendants, La Sal Oil Company 
("La Sal11) and Rio Vista Oil Limited ("Rio Vista") have either 
joined in or moved separately for the same relief. Hartford has 
filed an objection and a supporting memorandum. 
Hartford has also filed a supplemental memorandum, to 
vhich La Sal responded with a motion to strike. The Court agrees 
with La Sal that the rules do not provide for supplemental 
memoranda. The motion to strike is accordingly granted and the 
Court will not consider the arguments contained therein in its 
decision. 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 880705692 
Page 2 
This action was filed in June 22# 1988, Rio Vista 
answered on July 18, 1988. Utah responded on August 24, 1988, 
with a Motion for More Definite Statement, which was granted.1 
La Sal answered on December 7, 1988. On December 30, 1988, 
counsel for Hartford filed a Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of 
Bankruptcy. This document states that counsel for Hartford is 
George H. Speciale; but from the context, it is not possible to 
be sure whether Mr. Speciale was bankruptcy counsel or counsel in 
this case. Certainly Mr. Speciale did not file a notice of 
appearance in this case. 
There is no question that, between December 30, 1988, 
and the filing of the first motion to dismiss on March 29, 1993, 
Hartford has done nothing to move this case forward. It is 
incumbent upon Hartford to explain why four years of inaction are 
justified by a bankruptcy filing. Hartford has provided no 
information about why this case could not have been pursued 
during the bankruptcy, or even when the bankruptcy ended.2 It is 
also incumbent upon Hartford, as plaintiff, to move a case 
forward. That defendants have not pressed Hartford to pursue its 
action during the last four years is no excuse for the failure of 
Hartford to do so. 
'Hartford has never filed the amended complaint required by this ruling. 
*La Sal asserts, in its reply memorandum, that the bankruptcy was dismissed in October, 
1990. 
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Hartford has presented no substantial explanation of 
its failure to pursue this action. The Court is convinced, from 
the evidence and arguments presented, that Hartford elected to 
ignore this action, hoping that something would happen to make 
prosecution of the case less expensive, or improve its chances of 
success• 
The defendants claim that they have suffered prejudice 
because the passage of time has affected their ability to gather 
evidence for the defense. The Court discounts some of those 
claims because most of the defendants have had the opportunity 
and the incentive to gather much of the same evidence in related 
matters. However, the Court recognizes that witnesses become 
less available as time passes and that some tests, particularly 
on carpeting, cannot be performed now that the carpeting has been 
replaced. 
Hartford asserts that the failure of defendants to give 
notice to appoint successor counsel or appear in person mandates 
denial of the motion. The Court agrees that defendants did fail 
to comply with Rule 4*506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration* 
Given the ambiguity in the notice of withdrawal and the absence 
of a notice of appearance by other counsel, the defendant should 
have given a notice under Rule 4*506. However, the remedy for 
such a failure is not necessarily denial of the motion. The 
remedy is to grant Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
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filed in violation of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately 
respond. It is evident here that Hartford has had that 
opportunity. 
The motions to dismiss are granted. Counsel for the 
defendants are directed to prepare an order or orders for 
execution by the Court. 
DATED this \^\^Y day of June* ,1993. 
yle R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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Otputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, a 
Utah corporation, dba MOAB 
U-SERVE, aka STARS FOOD STORE, 
LASALLE OIL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, dba GORDON'S 
SINCLAIR, STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE 
and JOHN DOES I-X 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FOR LACK OF 
PROSECUTION WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No, 880705692 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
After review of the pleadings and filings of counsel in 
this matter and upon receipt of the Notice to Submit for Decision, 
and good cause appearing therefore, it is therefore ORDERED that: 
1. The Motions to Dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff 
Hartford Leasing Corporation ("Hartford") with prejudice for 
.failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., are hereby 
granted. The entire complaint of Plaintiff is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice against all Defendants. The Motions to Dismiss 
include the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant State of Utah, 
Defendant La Sal Oil Company ("La Sal") and as joined by Defendant 
Rio Vista Oil Limited. Hartford filed an objection and supporting 
memorandum. Defendant State of Utah ("State") and Defendant 
La Sal filed a reply. 
2. Hartford also filed a supplemental memorandum. 
Defendant State and Defendant La Sal filed a motion to strike the 
supplemental memorandum. This is based on the determination that 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501, does not 
provide for supplemental memoranda and the motion to strike is 
accordingly granted and the Court did not consider the arguments 
contained in the supplemental memoranda in its decision. 
3. This Order is based upon the Court's "Ruling on 
Motion to Dismiss", dated June 21, 1993,^on file herein, and hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
4. Each party is responsible for its own costs and fees 
incurred in this matter. 
DATED this /fT/A day of July, 1993 
l.td^U. 
rable Lyle R. Anderson 
f tr ic t Court Judge 
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I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION WITH PREJUDICE, U.S- Mail, first-
class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Alan S. Bachman 
Assistant Attorney General 
Room 4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
J. Michael Hansen 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson 
Attorneys at Law 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
J. James Clegg 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Steven C. Tycksen 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
DEPUTY CLERK 
-3-
ADDENDUM 6 
RULING ON OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER, DATED 7/19/93 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COUPT 
~iri.,n •".'vnty 
mb
 J U I 1 9 1393 
0#puty 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
8TATE OF UTAH 
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs ! 
RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, 
LA SAL OIL COMPANY, 1 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Civil No. 880705692 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Plaintiff filed Hartford Leasing's Objection to 
Proposed Order dated July 15, 1993, by beginning a facsimile 
transmission at 4:58 p.m., which ended at 5:10 p.m. The Court 
had already signed the Order of Dismissal with instructions to 
file it if no objection was received on July 15, 1993. That 
order was filed before the facsimile transmission was received. 
Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside its ruling for 
several reasons. 
It is true -that plaintiff requested oral argument when 
it filed its original memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss. Under Rule 4*501, plaintiff would have been entitled to 
oral argument. However, plaintiff thereafter filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision that reads in full as follows: 
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Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal filed with the Court on or near the 7th 
day of April, 1993, by Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, is now at issue and ready for 
decision of the Court, 
The natural interpretation of this notice is that 
nothing remained to be done before the Court rendered a decision, 
and that plaintiff had waived its right to oral argument. The 
Court accordingly ruled without oral argument. 
Plaintiff now presents evidence, or at least argument, 
about additional efforts it made to push this case toward a 
resolution. The Court cannot consider these arguments or 
evidence. They should have been presented before the motions 
were submitted for decision. 
The Court reaffirms its ruling that supplemental 
memoranda are not permitted. Even if they were permitted, the 
supplemental memoranda submitted by plaintiff before it filed the 
Notice to Submit for Decision would not have altered the Court's 
decision. 
Rule 41, U.R.C.P. clearly states that dismissals for 
failure to prosecute are with prejudice unless the Court other-
wise specifies* This Court specifically states that this 
dismissal is with prejudice. 
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Plaintiff's objection is accordingly overruled and the 
dismissal is confirmed. 
DATED the 19th day of July, 1993. 
' L ///„ 
Lyfe R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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